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I. THE MACHIAVELLIAN THEORY OF RIGHT
In this paper, “legal moralism” is to be understood in a wide sense as 
the promotion, outright coercive, or otherwise, of conceptions of the good by
the state—assuming in a Kelsenian way that any state action means legal 
action.1  Under consideration is the possibility of excluding the good from
the bounds of the law under a theory of political right of Machiavellian
origin.2  Anticipating the conclusion, this paper will seek to verify whether 
the Machiavellian case is the only one excluding the good from the bounds
of the law in a coherent manner, regardless of its merits and the inherent
condemnation of legal moralism in conclusive terms. 
* © 2017 Luís Pereira Coutinho.  University of Lisbon’s Faculty of Law/University of
Lisbon’s Centre for Research in Public Law.
 1. Norberto Bobbio, Kelsen and Legal Power, in NORMATIVITY AND NORMS: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON KELSENIAN THEMES 438 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski 
Paulson eds., Bonnie Litschewski Paulson, Stanley L. Paulson & Michael Sherberg, trans.,
Clarendon Press, 1998). 
2. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 61 (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., Univ. of
Chi. Press 2d ed. 1998) (1532). 
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A Machiavellian theory of right is different from that which is usually 
considered.3  The usual case against legal moralism rests on categorical 
reasons regarding respect for personal autonomy.  Well, the latter case,
one may consider preliminarily, is either under-solid or over-solid, according 
to the scope of those categorical reasons. 
If what is meant is the respect for autonomy as a regulative principle 
(hereinafter A1),4 and if that principle concerns the desirability of human
beings acting according to valid reasons and involving themselves in valid
pursuits, then the case is both incoherent—which will be elaborated on in a
later section—and under-solid: many conceptions of the good excluded by
the case against legal moralism are not grounded in the exercise of autonomy
in any recognizably regulative sense, but those conceptions can be 
considered unreasoned or even silly with property.  If, on the contrary, 
what is meant is respect for autonomy in a non-normative sense (hereinafter
A2), the “just do it” version of autonomy, and the inherent exclusion
of heteronomy altogether—being the case against legal moralism, a
negative case, one for mere non-heteronomy—then the case will be solid 
in excluding the good from the bounds of the legal; however, I am afraid it
will be so at the prohibitive price of extinguishing the law altogether.
From a political right perspective, the case is different.5  Autonomy, if
it is to be respected, will not be respected categorically or out of respect
either for A1 or A2 in themselves, but rather might be respected 
hypothetically or instrumentally.6  Individual autonomy is to be respected, 
and legal moralism is to be excluded only if—and to the degree in which— 
the constitutional arrangement, which respects autonomy is a better 
arrangement overall from a political perspective that has its own reasons.
The latter are therefore political reasons against which no categorical reasons
are opposable. 
Those political reasons concern the effectiveness of power in achieving its
ends, taken to be the only source of its legitimacy.  More precisely, from
this perspective, the effectiveness of power corresponds to its legitimacy:
according to Machiavelli, there is a necessary correspondence between 
political ends and the ends of “vulgar” men.7  For the Florentine, if “in the
world there is no one but the vulgar,” they are necessarily the only ones 
acknowledging the legitimacy of power, and they will do it in the exclusive
 3. PHILIP BOBBITT, THE GARMENTS OF COURT AND PALACE: MACHIAVELLI AND
THE WORLD THAT HE MADE 32 (2013). 
4. This version of autonomy values reasoned self-regulation as a right in the
Kantian tradition. See infra Section III. 
5. See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 43 (2003).
6. See id. at 140. 
7. See MACHIAVELLI supra note 2, at 71. 
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measure of its success—namely, in the satisfaction of their own utilities 
because they are “taken in by the appearance and the outcome of a thing.”8 
The “vulgar” value types of utilities—against which the legitimacy of 
power or the constitutional arrangement establishing it is exclusively to 
be assessed—that must therefore be satisfied.  Indeed, it is “not prudent to
challenge” the “opinion of the many,” even if illusory.9  Accordingly, if in
light of that opinion—namely, the “common understanding” of what
it means to respect persons and for the state to be neutral—mere non­
heteronomy is, among others, an individual utility to be enjoyed, then
an effective constitutional arrangement should respect A2, keeping those 
in power from unnecessarily challenging it.
To the degree in which A2 is respected only instrumentally and is not 
the only utility valued by “the many,” not to challenge it unnecessarily
means to restrict it within a calculus in which the utility of non-heteronomy 
is measured up against other utilities also valued by those “many,” including, 
most importantly, collective and individual security.10  The “harm principle” 
in its strong non-perfectionist sense may well be the result of that utilitarian 
calculus.11 
From a Machiavellian perspective, A2 is respected, not A1.  As already 
seen, from that perspective, what must respected is the common understanding 
of autonomy, its significance according to vulgar opinion— and it is hard to
deny that, in that light, or darkness, autonomy means mere non-heteronomy.
Moreover it is doubtful whether A1, as a regulative principle, can be respected
non-categorically and, from a Machiavellian perspective, no categorical 
reasons are opposable to power.12  This regulatory principle does not
necessarily keep someone who, as an individual, accepts and cultivates A1
from also accepting a Machiavellian case against legal moralism involving 
the respect for mere non-heteronomy.  Reasons that are suitable at the
 8. Id.
 9. Id.
 10. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 163 (Christian E.
Detmold trans., Carlton House 1900). 
11. For a detailed discussion of the harm principle, see JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY 9 (Alburey Castell ed., F.S. Crofts & Co., Inc. 1947) (1859) (“[T]he only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”).
12. See LOUGHLIN, supra note 5, at 40. 
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level of individual action may be counterproductive at the level of political
action considering the “paradox of consequences.”13 
At the latter level, the worst reasons—the awareness that autonomy is
regarded by the “vulgar” as a utility amongst others and not as a regulative
principle—may eventually lead to better results in the promotion of A1.
If A2 is respected, the “opinion of the many”—which should not be 
challenged by a prudent state—will also be respected.  Moreover, the 
possibility of A1 will be preserved without necessarily excluding A2, and
it is hard to deny that A1 is promoted more if there is no external
compulsion leading to its endorsement through coercively excluding A2.
It may also be the case that A1 is better promoted if the inevitable harms 
A2 causes for those pursuing it fall upon themselves alone, and there is
no reason for not being so when non-heteronomy is the utility to be
respected according to the “opinion of the many.”14  Thus, by not hindering 
A2, the state may well be promoting A1 more effectively, even if indirectly. 
II. AGAINST PERFECTIONISM
Those endorsing A1 will only be kept from accepting the Machiavellian 
case against legal moralism if they simultaneously take A1 to be a 
perfectionist good and share a perfectionist approach to politics: an approach
according to which the state should not only not hinder the perfectionist 
good—in this case, reasoned self-regulation—but also endorse it directly, 
either through the repression of unreasoned self-regulation or through the
promotion of reasoned self-regulation and the goods resulting from it,
namely by the establishment of constitutive rules. 
A Machiavellian, perhaps unlike a perfectionist, will bear in mind that 
there will always be an element of coercion in the arrangement, be it
repressive or strictly promotional: mere non-heteronomy is negatively 
affected both by repression of unreasoned self-regulation and by the 
promotion of reasoned self-regulation and the goods resulting from it—in
the latter case, because the merely non-heteronomous action will not be 
promoted equally. Some believe there is no coercion in the latter case and
achieve that result by narrowing the concept of “coercion.”15  However, 
withholding benefits can serve as an inducement for legal compliance, 
13. See JULIEN FREUND, THE SOCIOLOGY OF MAX WEBER 54 (1968); H.H. Gerth & 
C. Wright Mills, Introduction to MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
54, 332 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans. 1953) (1946).. 
14. See John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 9, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/. 
15. See, e.g., Philip Selznick, Communitarian Jurisprudence, in TO PROMOTE THE 
GENERAL WELFARE: A COMMUNITARIAN LEGAL READER 35–36 (David E. Carney ed., 
1999). 
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that being the more truthful the more citizens are dependent on the state
for the necessities of life.16  Moreover, it is difficult, when state action is
at stake, not to associate inequality with external compulsion: inequality in
access to benefits or utilities or inequality regarding the factispecies of 
constitutive rules—for example, the rule establishing marriage—can be
as compulsory as inequality in supporting penalties.17  One cannot even
say that the latter is always harder to bear.  Therefore, rather than isolating 
the state’s promotional activities from coercive ones, one should distinguish 
outright coercion from other forms of coercion, involving manipulation or 
unequal treatment.18 
The coercive nature of a perfectionist arrangement is not in itself an
objection from a Machiavellian perspective.  A Machiavellian has nothing 
against coercion in itself, be it outright coercion or otherwise, but only 
against ineffective and politically illegitimate coercion.  Strict political 
legitimacy—actual acknowledgment of power by those obeying it—will 
only be possible if power does not challenge the “opinion of the many,” 
including those utilities which, according to it, must be satisfied.19 Well, 
if the state tries to impose a regulative principle—negatively affecting 
utilities, mere non-heteronomy in the case, outside a utilitarian calculus 
intelligible by them—on “the many,” it is bound to see its legitimacy contested.
In that case, the imposition of a regulative principle (A1) will be made in
detriment of A2 outside a utilitarian calculus intelligible by those “many”
valuing A2 for its own sake.20 
One may object to a Machiavellian that those exercising A2 by not 
being coerced in any way to adopt A1 are also being invited to bear the 
inevitable harms resulting from A2. By coercing those exercising A2 to 
adopt A1, the state is thus potentially exempting them from those harms. 
16. See  FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 114 (2015) (citing JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 8, 193–94 (John Bowring ed., 1841)). 
17. See, e.g., Hendrik Hartog, Wives as Favorites, in  LAW AS CULTURE AND
CULTURE AS LAW 297–98 (Hendrik Hartog, William E. Nelson & Barbara Wilcie Kern
eds. 2000); Dolores Miller, Constitutive Rules and Essential Rules, 39 PHIL. STUDIES:
INT’L J. PHIL. ANALYTIC TRADITION 183, 184 (1981). 
18. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987); Mario Loyola, Trojan
Horse: Federal Manipulation of State Governments and the Supreme Court’s Emerging
Doctrine of Federalism, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 113, 116–17, 135 (2011). 
19. On the “bond between prince and people” that is created when princes serve the 
“ends” of “ordinary citizens,” see JEFFREY ABRAMSON, MINERVA’S OWL: THE TRADITION
OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 158 (2009). 
20.  Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy and Utility, 95 ETHICS 5, 5–6 (1984). 
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The “chilling effect” of the latter harms on A2 can be more intense than 
the harm, which results from the outright promotion of A1.  However, that 
objection would be beside the Machiavellian point. From this perspective,
the utilities of “the many” as perceived by “the many” are relevant for the
legitimacy of power.  The concept that one should bear the harms A2 causes
is understood by “the many” who value A2 for its own sake.  Moreover, 
the idea that one should bear penalties or lack equal benefits as defined by
the state in the same circumstance is not so understandable, even if the 
latter are potentially more lenient than the former. Political legitimacy is 
only affected when the state is to blame for the hampering and not when, 
according to the “opinion of the many,” those who are hampered by those
inevitable harms, which result for themselves from the state failing to 
promote A1 are the only ones to blame.21 
The second and most important Machiavellian objection to a perfectionist 
case made in the name of A1 is that the direct promotion of normative
principles or goods, perfectionist or otherwise, by political means or
arrangements is bound to fail.22  In the case of A1, we have already seen 
that the good effects that eventually result from directly promoting it will
fail in relationship to the good effects that result from indirectly promoting 
it through the respect of A2: a coerced reasoned self-regulation is hardly
self-regulation.  One may even ask whether A1 has any real advantage
from its transformation into an ideal to be coerced.  Because moral agents
are, in this case, implicitly assumed not to be entirely capable of determining 
themselves exclusively on their own into an actual exercise of A1,23 this
may well be a clear case in which the political endorsement of a good 
means its very negation.24 
The counterproductive nature of the political endorsement of a 
perfectionist good, clear in the case of A1, can perhaps be affirmed regarding 
any perfectionist good, that if one considers the “endorsement constraint”: 
“no life goes better by being led from the outside according to values the 
21. See MACHIAVELLI supra note 2, at 71. 
22. STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT 109 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1998). 
23. Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy & Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom, S.
CAL. L. REV. 1098, 1131 (1989). 
 24. Steven Wall, Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 10, 2012), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perfectionism­
moral/. Wall acknowledges that “[i]t is possible that an ethical environment that results
from no state perfectionism will be ideal for the autonomous decision making of its 
members”; however, he adds that “[n]oncoercive state perfectionist measures may be able 
to counteract or cancel various pressures and influences that would otherwise impede
rational decision making by its citizens. Designed well, such measures might contribute to
an ethical environment in which people were best able to respond to the reasons for and
against the options they confront.”  Id.
350
COUTINHO (DO NOT DELETE) 8/16/2018 9:59 AM     
 










   
   
     
 
 
   
  
    
  
   
   
   
 







      
[VOL. 54:  345, 2017] The Machiavellian Case 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
person does not endorse.”25  That is, for a perfectionist good “to improve
a person’s life[,] he or she must endorse its value,” or at least accept it
wholeheartedly—if one distinguishes endorsement from wholehearted
acceptance26—and therefore “political measures that compel or guide people
into activities or pursuits that they do not value will be counterproductive.”27 If
one added to the “endorsement constraint” the eventual incompetence of 
state officials, one could even be led to imagine, as Steven Wall did, “a 
view that holds that perfectionist political ends will be best achieved if no 
state official accepts the perfectionist approach to politics.”28 
Until now, the perfectionist approach being discussed assumes A1—as 
previously defined as reasoned self-regulation, instead of arbitrary or 
plainly silly—is the perfectionist good to be promoted.29 If instead the 
perfectionist good to be promoted is autonomy in a Razian sense—thus,
A1 + N, because it involves more than merely reasoned self-regulation, 
implying also the adoption of multiple “acceptable and valuable projects 
and relationships”30—then I believe the Machiavellian case against
perfectionism will be reinforced.  Indeed, in the latter case, the state is called 
to determine which projects and relationships are valuable or not, and the 
state can be taken to be “the last agency to whom subtle questions of personal 
morality should be entrusted.”31 
Effectiveness is always a background consideration for a Machiavellian, 
and, in this case, effectiveness can be doubted on solid grounds. The
widespread “best judge” argument—that is, that individuals are always in
a better position to judge what projects and relationships are more valuable
for themselves than the state32—is not necessarily one of those grounds.
Empirically, it is possible to argue against the best judge argument in
a quite convincing manner.  Simon Caney has made the contrary case and
pointed out the epistemological and evaluative problems inevitably involved
 25. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
216 (2d ed. 2002). 
26. Wall, supra note 24. 
27. Id.
 28. Id.
 29. See infra Section II.
 30. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 417 (1986). 
31. Waldron, supra note 23, at 1131. 
 32. Simon Caney, Consequentialist Defences of Liberal Neutrality, 41 PHIL. Q. 457, 463
(1991). 
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in single individuals’ judgments: problems that may be minor in the case 
of collective action on communitarian grounds.33 
The empirical effectiveness problem, however, does not concern only
the probability of the state incurring less judgment errors than individuals 
as long as it follows adequate procedures and considers solid communitarian
grounds, eventually regarding those “cherished aspects of our culture” Raz 
refers to.34  Instead, the problem concerns the exponential nature of any 
state error, which will be induced on multiple individuals; that does not 
happen with those errors individuals make, which are only induced on
themselves. 
The greatest problem for a Machiavellian, however, is not so much 
empirical ineffectiveness but political ineffectiveness, which concerns the 
possible endangerment of political consistency—and legitimacy—resulting
from the state interfering on these matters.  After sustaining that “the general 
effect of the risk of failure cannot lead to anti-perfectionism” but only to
“general caution,” Raz affirms that he thinks of no “special reason to fear
failure or the consequences of failure when trying to promote conceptions of 
the good.”35  Well, Raz’s imagination may be failing him in this respect.
Indeed, if according to Raz, autonomy is a value in itself, and the value 
of projects and relationships is not independent from their autonomous 
validation—and if one believes Raz also considers that his “A1 + N” sort 
of autonomy should be accepted as such by autonomous persons themselves— 
then autonomous failure will be much more acceptable from the perspective 
of an autonomous person, or a person considering herself as autonomous, 
than state-induced failure: if it was not state-induced failure but self-
induced failure, at least the equation would be “A1 - 1” and not “- A1 - 1,” 
which will be in the case of state-induced failure.  She may eventually be 
convinced to accept the equation “- A1 + 1”—although I cannot see exactly 
how Raz himself is; however, she will not accept the equation “- A1 - 1” and
will therefore contest the arrangement fiercely.  For a Machiavellian, this 
is more than a “special reason” to fear failure or the consequences of failure. 
One may eventually consider that the “valuable projects and relationships”
are those which are valued in the traditional ways of life of the society
over which the state rules and that the state cannot err, at least politically, 
in endorsing them.36  However, in modern societies those traditional ways
are increasingly contested and even vanishing, which gives way to 
autonomy-supporting environments.  As Raz himself says, “[f]or those who 
live in an autonomy-supporting environment[,] there is no choice but to
 33. See id. at 463–64. 
34. RAZ, supra note 30, at 162. 
35. Id. at 160. 
36. Id. at 417. 
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be autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such society.”37 Taking 
up that description of modern social environments, Waldron considers
accurately that: 
[It] suggests that a government which fails to promote autonomy [as non­
heteronomy] in a social environment of this kind, makes life unbearable for its
citizens. When the government engages in this type of activity it takes away from
its citizens the only chance to prosper that they have. Stifling autonomy might be
a permissible political strategy in a society where traditional ways of life are still 
available; where the conditions for non-autonomous life have disappeared,
however, the government must accept autonomy as the only route left open for
the individuals it governs. When an account of the duty to promote, or not
interfere with, autonomy is presented along these lines, it is not clear at all that it 
is a duty to promote autonomy only to the extent that autonomous choices are good
choices. Though the value of autonomy to the people who exercise it will certainly be
bound up with the values they pursue in their choosing, the importance of
promoting autonomy as an imperative for governments can be defended [or non-
defended] quite independently of that.38 
One could say that there is still something a government can do to
promote autonomy in a regulative sense and as leading to the adoption of 
“acceptable and valuable projects and relationships”39—that something 
being a perfectionist education of its citizens.  A Machiavellian will doubt
whether such a course will be effective in leading citizens, at least “the
many,” to take subsequent interferences in their autonomy as bearable 
considering educational goods themselves are not and cannot plausibly be 
open to all in an equal degree; no government will insure that they are
unless it turns into a Platonic government, which deprives parents and
non-state social institutions from interfering in education.
 37. Id. at 391. 
38. Waldron, supra note 23, at 1129.  Even if traditional ways of life are still
available and are considered to be goods by the states, there is no chance in any known
modern social context for them to be the single goods available.  On the contrary, they will
still be available in an inescapably autonomous-supporting environment.  Since we are 
talking about non-divisible goods, it is not clear whether there is an effective strategy for
the state to promote them non-arbitrarily and legitimately. Wall’s case  according to which 
it is not arbitrary for the state to endorse a perfectionist political action if a substantial
majority supports it, if there is some form of compensation for minorities, does not seem 
to be convincing, see Steven Wall, Neutralism for Perfectionists: The Case of Restricted 
State Neutrality, 120 ETHICS 232, 244 (2010); minorities can be vocal and have constitutional 
means on their side even if Wall departs from a very valid point: before non-divisible 
goods, “the strategy of apportioning support for different goods according to the numbers 
is not an option.”  POLITICAL NEUTRALITY: A RE-EVALUATION 69 (Roberto Merrill & Daniel
Weinstock eds., 2014). 
39. RAZ, supra note 30, at 417. 
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Moreover, the definition of those “acceptable and valuable projects and 
relationships,” which are to be promoted through education, is bound to
be contested. In an autonomy-supporting environment, which inevitably
is the environment of modern societies, it will be perhaps wiser for a 
government to avoid an education that explicitly cultivates valuable projects
or relationships. In that case, at least, it will not be forced to cultivate 
“equally” those non-valuable projects and relationships its citizens take 
up as their own—vocational training in prostitution comes to mind in this 
context.
There is still one consideration to be made: the state, even if it could 
reach consensual results on what the perfectionist projects and relationships
to be promoted are, would never guarantee full effectiveness regarding the
non-promotion of non-valuable projects and relationships.  The latter, perhaps 
more satisfying immediately, would still be pursued, and there would be 
no way of not blaming a state enjoying the monopoly of force for that pursuit.
In this context, Scalia’s remarks at a Harvard lecture in 1989 may be 
relevant: “Parents know that children will accept quite readily all sorts of
arbitrary substantive dispositions—no television in the afternoon, or no
television in the evening, or even no television at all. But try to let [or not 
to impede by outright coercion] one brother or sister watch television when
the others do not, and you will feel the fury of the fundamental sense of
justice unleashed.”40  That is, unless one is ready to use outright coercion in
repressing everything one considers non-valuable—and Raz does not make 
that case—and that outright coercion is fully effective—which it may be 
in the case of parents but will not be in the case of states unless they are fully 
totalitarian states and these are by no means supported by Machiavellians41 
—one does better if one does not interfere minimally in the business of 
defining what is valuable. 
Indeed, the well-known point Raz made against state neutrality may be 
inverted: “within the range of duties which the State owes its citizens,
failure to help is hinderance.”42  And unless the state wishes to permanently 
awake its citizens’ “fundamental sense of justice”—in Scalia’s ironic but
unfortunately accurate sense—it is better not to be perceived that way.43
 40. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1178 (1989).
41. A Machiavellian rejects totalitarianism, not on moral reasons, but on pragmatic
reasons: totalitarian states are only possible if taken over by all-encompassing ideologies
leading to full mobilization, to a degree in which pragmatism—including most importantly
pragmatism regarding the effectiveness of power and the utilities of individuals—is lost. 
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 420 (1976). Nothing can be more 
un-Machiavellian than that.
 42. RAZ, supra note 30, at 124. 
43. Scalia, supra note 40. 
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I hope these last considerations made it clear that the Machiavellian 
reasons for rejecting the perfectionist approach to politics are not necessarily
the worst reasons.  Those reasons do not imply denying the value of regulative 
autonomy and of valuable projects and relationships as goods for individuals.
A Machiavellian may even sympathize with the perfectionist case at
the normative level when considering an ideal state, but he will not ignore 
the “actual truth of things,” therefore conceiving of actual states as Don 
Quixotes fighting windmills.44 
What ultimately matters, when considering the “actual truth of things,” 
is that the reasons for which actual governments promote, or abstain from,
perfectionist goods—A1 or A1 + N—are not and cannot be “exactly or 
simplistically identical with the value of autonomy to autonomous individuals.”45 
Reasons for actual governments, unlike reasons for individuals, must concern
political legitimacy and effective results: what would be the good of a
government bound to reach counterproductive results and paralyzed by
contestation? 
III. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE DEONTOLOGICAL CASE
The typical non-Machiavellian case against legal moralism rests on 
deontological reasons centred on A1, in there residing the axis of a “critical
morality” leading to the exclusion of “positive moralities” from the law.46 
Autonomy is the axis of a “critical morality”—a right in the Kantian 
44. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE 230 (Charles Jarvis trans., 1853) (1605). 
45. Waldron, supra note 23, at 1129. 
46. One could say that that is not a fair description of the case made by Hart, since 
his “critical morality” is utilitarian or consequentialist and not Kantian or deontological 
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, & MORALITY 21–22 (1963).  However, if one goes back to 
the confessed source of Hart’s argument, Mill’s anti-paternalism, which is also purportedly 
“utilitarian,” its bedrock is the human being as a “progressive being” an ideal relating to 
his or hers autonomous “reasoning and judgment,” in there residing the foundation of his
or hers “comparative worth,” which would be referred to by Kant as his or her “dignity.” 
See  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY & OTHER ESSAYS 46, 65, 66, 148 (John Gray ed., 
1991).  Indeed, the core of Mill’s argument seems to be that the autonomous “reasoning
and judgment” of human beings is to be respected, even if the consequences to be
eventually endured by themselves—or the overall consequences for society—are worse.
From Mill’s perspective, nothing would be worse than to unrightfully dehumanize those
virtually “progressive beings,” for example, to reduce them into “apes” by paternalizing
them. Well, that is a deontological argument even if presented as utilitarian.  It is not therefore 
unfair to refer to this tradition, also in its Millian branch, as centered on a moral axis centered 
on the respect for persons as autonomous, or virtually autonomous. 
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tradition47—because it is a regulative principle, allowing individuals, taken 
to be free and equal, to reasonably endorse purposes and relationships in a
way that should not be obstructed by external compulsions. 
One of the objections—perhaps the main objection—raised against the 
typical case against legal moralism concerns its incoherence.48  That 
incoherence is exposed by not begging the questions as to why and how 
autonomy is a right in the aforementioned sense. Indeed, the answer to
those questions cannot be immune to the idea that autonomy, A1, besides 
being a self-regulative principle, is also a perfecting principle to be endorsed 
by individuals; A1 is therefore a good and can only be plausibly defended 
as a right if it is also a good.  Moreover, even if the deontological reasons 
—that is, reasons regarding A1 as a right—could be separated from 
corresponding teleological reasons—that is, reasons regarding A1 as a 
good—the fact that both rationales belong to a “common moral core” would
still taint the possibility of using the former without promoting the latter.49 
In summary, it will be ultimately difficult, if not impossible, to explain 
why the state should act on the basis of a “moral core” and implicitly
demand individuals to endorse it, precisely when it is required to be neutral
on questions regarding the good; that is, it seems that the deontological case 
against legal moralism is legally moralist.50 
Well, that difficulty will not be one from a Machiavellian perspective. 
Its right—a political right51—defines itself as autonomous from morality 
and even from a moral foundation.  Its axis is the state itself: the secular
ends of the state taken to be coincidental with the ones of the “vulgar”: if 
47. Hart, and before him, Mill, present their arguments as utilitarian but the core of 
their case against legal moralism is deontological and is only understandable as deontological.
See HART, supra note 46, at 20, 22. 
48. HART, supra note 46, at 3. 
49. RAZ, supra note 30, at 137. Raz has a point in saying that, if an autonomy-
related conception of the right—or deontological reasons—and an autonomy centered 
conception of the good—or teleological reasons—derive from a “common moral core”, 
then the case for the exclusion of ideals of the good from politics is endangered. Id.  For 
him, “since the core moral concern should be politically promoted through the enforcement of
some deontological constraints it seems plausible to hold that it should also be promoted 
by advancing the correct conception of the good as well.”  Id.
50. This difficulty was previously pointed out by Thomas Nagel who accused those 
who defend neutrality as a principle of political morality of being incoherent with themselves:
as such, the principle will need a morally non-neutral justification, and how can one be
morally non-neutral when justifying neutrality? See Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, 82
CORNELL PHIL. REV. 220, 227 (1973).  I believe the point Nagel makes cannot be entirely
dismissed through the distinction of critical morality from positive morality, HART, supra
note 46, at 17, 20, the right from the good, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 392– 
94 (rev. ed. 1999), or autonomy from conceptions of the good, Waldron, supra note 23, at
1136. 
51.  On political right, see MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 43 (2003). 
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there is any “foundation” at all, the “vulgar” are that foundation—“We the
people,” one could say mischievously.  From that perspective, a “political 
morality” is a contradiction in terms, and state neutrality, the exclusion of 
legal moralism, is not only acceptable—we have seen it can be advantageous 
for political legitimacy and political effectiveness—but fully coherent. 
In other words, a Machiavellian right—political right—may justify 
neutrality in a non-incoherent way because there is nothing good about it.
More precisely, if there is any good about political right it is, unlike autonomy,
a good of a different order and with a different justification from the goods 
individuals should consider as their own.  If that good of a different order 
considers the goods of or for individuals—namely autonomy in an autonomy-
supporting social environment—it does so, not because they are goods in 
themselves but because an alternative course would be politically imprudent. 
Individual goods, therefore, are reflexively considered from a Machiavellian
right perspective—and as such individuals may have an interest in accepting 
a Machiavellian political arrangement, perhaps even a “highest interest” 
as will be seen, but individual goods do not justify political right, nor do 
they pertain to the “core” of political right—namely, individual goods do 
not pertain incoherently to the core of the conception of the right leading
to their respect.52 
In this context, it is important to notice that the Rawlsian justification 
for political neutrality may have always been political and not Kantian, 
even if presented as Kantian.53  Indeed, Rawls’s argument for political 
neutrality can only be sustained on political reasons regarding the social
role of justice in political societies dominated by disagreement; not on the 
value of autonomy itself—the value according to which conceptions of 
the good adopted by human beings should be the outcome of deliberations 
of the same as free and equally rational.  As Raz points out:
[E]xtending the Kantian insight . . . explains the elimination of moral beliefs and
ideals of the good from behind the veil of ignorance.  But this argument by itself
does not justify political neutrality. The argument for neutrality still rests on the
further assumption that it is in people’s highest interest to adopt principles
fulfilling the social role of justice [and not principles concordant or deriving from 
their moral beliefs and ideals of the good].  Without its support we still have no
reason to believe that any agreement will be reached behind the veil of ignorance. 
52. RAZ, supra note 30, at 132, 137. 
53. See  JOHN  RAWLS, A THEORY OF  JUSTICE 452 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 
1999) (arguing that the Kantian interpretation of justice is based on people’s autonomy in 
acting from principles that best express their nature as free and equal rational beings). 
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Rawls shows neither that this assumption follows from the Kantian insight nor
that it leads to neutral political concern.54 
Rawls does not show that the argument leads to neutral political concern
because he does not explain, at least explicitly, why it is in the “people’s 
highest interest” to adopt principles fulfilling the social role of justice.55 
It is not because individuals endorse autonomy as a good from the start— 
that would be self-defeating—or out of the existence of disagreement
itself—it is a non sequitur to infer the imperative of neutral political
concern from the mere fact of disagreement.56  Rather, it is because it is
of utmost concern for individuals to live in societies in which there is an
effective and legitimate government capable of fulfilling their utilities, 
namely respect for their conceptions of the good in an atmosphere of peace 
and stability.57  That structure can only be possible if the corresponding
constitutional arrangement accomplishes the “social role of justice”—thus 
endorsed for prudential and not categorical reasons.58 
Being only defensible as an implicit political case and not on its explicit
Kantian grounds, the Rawlsian case for state neutrality is worse than an
outright Machiavellian case: a Machiavellian will not necessarily consider 
it in the people’s highest interests to generally adopt principles fulfilling 
the social role of justice but only to specifically adopt political principles—
those concerning political effectiveness and legitimacy. Unlike a Rawlsian, 
a Machiavellian knows that he must be modest in his claims, and, also
unlike a Rawlsian, he does not despise those endorsing non-autonomous 
conceptions of the good or heteronomous ways—or, if he does it at the 
54. RAZ, supra note 30, at 132. 
55. See RAWLS, supra note 53, at 456. 
56.  On this point, see Wall supra note 38, at 240. 
57. See Rawls, supra note 53. 
58. Lamore points out that the prudential nature of “people’s highest interest” in
endorsing the “social role of justice” is present in Rawls, who “himself sometimes relies 
upon a prudential basis for agreement to the principles of justice as well as the Kantian
one.” Charles Larmore, Michael J. Sandel: Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 81 J. 
PHIL. 337–38, 340 (1984) (book review).  If that is not entirely explicit in the Theory of 
Justice, it would later be clarified in Political Liberalism, one may add.  Indeed, one can 
read Rawls, not as a champion of the liberal ideal of neutrality but as suggesting a different 
model—the “modus vivendi model”—according to which
the political system represents chiefly a modus vivendi among people having 
different ultimate commitments . . . a system of mutual advantage, to which we
primarily adhere, not because it expresses our deepest self-understandings, but 
rather for the more prudential reason that it serves our other values.  In the midst 
of disagreement about the good life it not only preserves civil peace, but also 
protects our own particular view of the good . . . . This modus vivendi model 
holds, not that we lack an intrinsic as well as prudential interest in justice, but 
only that this prudential interest may be our primary motive for allegiance.
Id. at 338. 
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personal level, he does not confuse his own reasons with political reasons. 
On the contrary: he does know that people’s conceptions of the good, 
including autonomy, should not be despised or undervalued—least of all 
in what comes to the fundamental reasons for the political arrangement 
they are to inhabit—if political legitimacy is to be maintained. 
One must insist that, if a Machiavellian is led to the respect of autonomy,
inherently keeping the state neutral, it is because it is wiser to do so from 
the perspective of political effectiveness and legitimacy in the context of 
autonomy-supporting environments, which is the context of modern societies.59 
Conversely if it turned out to be unwise to fully respect autonomy and keep
the state neutral, a Machiavellian would have no qualms in adopting a non­
autonomist and non-neutralist stance.  There can be a Machiavellian case
against legal moralism, as there can be a Machiavellian case for legal 
moralism—namely, in the case of traditionalist or fundamentalist societies in
which the state can only attain stability if it rejects neutrality; it all depends 
on the context. 
The point of this paper was not to deny that a Machiavellian can either 
be a “state neutralist” or a “legal moralist,” depending on the context, but
to verify whether a case against legal moralism can be non-Machiavellian.
According to the argument above, the answer to the latter question seems 
to be negative: only a Machiavellian can defend a case against legal moralism 
in a fully coherent manner.  It is quite another question to see whether that
case is normatively worthy or not.  If it can only be Machiavellian, it probably
is not worthy.
It is also another question to know whether the Machiavellian case 
against legal moralism is ultimately a viable case and that considering
something that is persistently ignored by all those who oppose legal moralism
either from a deontological or a Machiavellian perspective, that something 
being the necessary embeddedness of law in the good. But that is a different 
matter, one transcending this mere divertimento. 
59. See RAZ, supra note 30, at 392–93. 
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